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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

.JERRY C. WOOD, DIANA
L. 'i\TOOD, and MICHAEL
D..WILLIAMS,
Defendants and Respondents.

l
)

Case No.

12237

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT MICHAEL D. WILLIAMS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
Appellant's cause is for rescission and cancellation of an automobile insurance policy it issued to
the Respondents Wood and for a declaratory judgment that Appellant under the terms of its policy
is obligated neither to defend Respondents Wood
against Respondent Williams' claim for personal
injury nor to pay any judgment obtained by Williams against \Vood.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court, James S. Sawaya, Judge,
granted \i\Tilliam's Motion for Summary Judgment
against Appellant on the basis of the Utah Safety
Responsibility Act and the lack of any issue of
material fact.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment
awarded and leave to join \V. W. Clyde & Company
as a party defendant on the sole basis that it was
the self-insured employer of the Respondent Williams at the time Williams was injured by Wood.
Respondent seeks to have the judgment affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 1, 1968, the Defendant and Respondent, Jerry C. Wood (herinafter called "Wood")
applied for an automobile liability policy to State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
(hereinafter called "State Farm"). Wood's application showed that he was 26 years old and an
employed musician but that he did not drive and had ,
never had a driver's license; that the designated
automobile was the first car that either he or Dianna
L. Wood had ever owned and that neither of them
had been previously insured, arrested or fined,
involved in any automobile loss or accident, had a
drivers license or registration suspended, revoked
01· ref used, or had insurance cancelled or refused,
during the five years prior to application. (R-2, 5,
43, 101, 102) Each of these representations made to
State Farm's agent was false. On June 16, 1964,
June 16, 1965, October 6, 1965, June 12, 1966,
February 10, and April 13, 1967 Wood was convicted for speeding. On May 7, 1964 he was convicted
for running a red light and on September 17,
1065 for d1·iving too fast for existing conditions.
2

Wood's license to drive was suspended on May 8,
1967 and the suspension extended to August 8,
1968 for traffic violations occurring during the
suspension. On September 17, 1965 and April 12,
1967 he was involved in automobile accidents.
(R-26-27) Nevertheless the policy was issued
and was in force on May 6, 1968 when Wood
drove his automobile into the Respondent Michael
D. Williams (hereina'fter called "Williams"), seriously injuring him. Not until October 29, 1968 did
State Farm commence its suit for rescission. ( R-1)
There is no evidence before this court that Williams
was an employee of W. W. Clyde & Company
acting within the coui·se and scope of his employment at the time of said injury or that W.W. Clyde
& Company is a self-insured workmen's compensation employer, but such facts are not denied. The
Respondent Williams takes no issue otherwise with
Appellant's statement of facts and has restated
only those which he deems pertinent to this review.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY
AW ARD ED IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ISSUE
OF MATERIAL FACT.

Appellant at page 11 of its brief cites the
questions of fact it deems material to prevent
summary judgment against it. Williams, for purposes of his motion for summary judgment only,
admitted all questions of fact, as pleaded by
3

Appellant. ( R-80) The main question on appeal
therefore is whether or not, admitting the extensive
fraud by Wood, State Farm is nevertheless liable on '
its policy under the provisions of the Safety
Responsibilty Act, particularly §41-12-21, once a •
loss occured whereby the rights of an innocent third ·
party intervened.
I
Apart from the statute, Williams has raised
the defenses of estoppel, waiver and !aches on the
ground that the information on Wood's policy
application should have compelled either outright
rejection of the application or further inquiry before
issuance of the policy. (R-59-63, 81, 82) Admittedly, the policy was in force at the time of the loss,
more than two months after the application was
signed by Wood. The information given by Wood
was so incredulous and, as a matter of judicial
notice, could have been so easily verified by State
Farm telephoning the Division of Financial Responsibility or the Driver's License Division of the
Department of Public Safety, that as a matter of
law, State Farm waived the fact of misrepresentation, did not rely or should not have relied on the
same, is estopped to rescind the policy 5Yz months
after the loss and is guilty of !aches in investigating
Wood's record and in seeking to rescind the policy.
"Whatever is notice enough to excite attention and
put the party on his guard and call for inquiry is
notice of everything to which such inquiry might
have led." McGarry v. Thompson, 201 P.2d 288, 114
4
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U 442 ( 1948). The California Supreme Court has
not permitted automobile liability carriers to avoid
their public duty by pointing blame at their own
clients, the insured.
The reasonable expectation of both the public
and the insured is that the insurer will duly
perform its basic commitment; to provide,
insurance. . . . "Insurance companies are
engaged in the business of running risks for
pay;*** p. 682
* * * *
With respect to an insurance policy voidable
under the Insurance Code, if an automobile,
liability insurer can perpetually postpone the
investigation of insurability and concurrently
retain its right to rescind until the injured
person secures a judgment against the insured and sues the carrier, then the insurer
can accept compensation without running any
risk whatsoever. Such a rule would permit
an automobile liability insurer to continue
to pocket premiums and to take no steps at all
to probe the verity of the application for the
issued policy unless and until the financial
interest of the insurer so dictated. Furthermore, under such a rule, the carrier would
be permitted to deal with the insured as
though he were insured, and thus to lead him
to believe that he was in fact insured.

* * * *

State Farm's alleged practice of postponing
its investigation of insurability until after
the assertion of a "significant" claim produces the dangerous condition that owners
of cars will be driving on the streets and
highways in the erroneous belief that they
5

are insured and that the public generally will
utilize these streets and highways with the
frustrated expectation that insurance companies would fulfill, not thwart, the basic purposes of the Financial Responsibility Law.
This latter expectation can only be fulfilled
however, by recognition of the duty of
automobile liability insurer to undertake
within a reasonable time from issuance of
the policy a reasonable investigation of insurability and by penalizing the breach of
that duty by loss of the right of rescission.
(p. 684)
Barrera v. State Farm, Mutual Automobile Insitrance Co., 456 P.2d 674, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1969) at
p. 682.
This court has been no less perceptive of the
problem. In Peterson v. Western Casualty & Silrety
Company, 425 P.2d 769, 19 U.2d, 26 (1967) it said:

The issuance of the policy and the payment
of premiums establishes prim a f acie the liability of the insurer ...
That being the case, the insurer has a duty, if it
wants to avoid the policy, to exercise diligence in its
own behalf and cannot charge the injured party with
loss arising out of its own negligence in issuing the ,
policy or delay in investigating the applicant. In
Peterson, the insurer attempted in vain to escape
liability to an injured party on the ground that the
insured had failed to cooperate in his defense. After
noting that one purpose of automobile insurance is
to protect the public, the court exposed the root of
the matter with precision.

1
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In view of the anomalous situation where
the insurance company has received compensation for undertaking a responsibility which
it may be able to avoid by failing to discharge
one part of its duty, it is proper to require
a showing that the company used the same
degree of diligence to secure the insured's
cooperation that would have been exercised by
a reasonable and prudent person where the
cooperation of the insured would be to its
advantage in protecting it against liability,
rather than to relieve it therefrom.
If State Farm investigated the admitted facts, there
is no showing before this court that it did anything
to protect itself against liability until October 29,
1968 when it sued for rescission. There being,
as a matter of law, nothing that State Farm
could raise in justification for not having either
refused Wood's application or else having rescinded
the policy prior to the loss, no issue of material fact
1·emains and Williams is entitled to have the
judgment affirmed. Pioneer Savings & Loan Association v. Pioneer Finance and Thrift Co., 417 P.2d
121, 18U.2d106, (1960) p. 123.
POINT II
UNDER THE TERMS AND POLICY OF THE
UTAH SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY ACT, STATE
FARM'S LIABILITY ON WOOD'S POLICY
BECAME ABSOLUTE AT THE TIME OF LOSS,
NOTWITHSTANDING SAID POLICY WAS NOT
CERTIFIED AS PROOF OF FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY.

34, 766 reported motor vehicle accidents occured
7

in Utah in 1969. Utah State Department of Public
Safety Official Compilation. The cost of motor
vehicle accidents in 1960 in Utah was conservatively
placed at $43,000,000. Utah Safety Council memorandum "Accident Prevention in Economic Terms."
Compensatory remedial statutes designed to minimize the hardship flowing from the lack of financial
responsibility of highway users involved in accidents
v,rere first passed in 1925. Kesler v. Department
of Public Safety, etc, Utah, 369 U.S. 153, 82 S. Ct.
807 (1962) atp.812. ThepurposeofUtah'sactisto
assure that those using the highways are financially
able to defray the cost of any injury or damage
they inflict by driving an automobile.
The ever-increasing number of injuries from
automobile accidents and the high proportion
of drivers who have insufficient financial
responsibility has been taken cognizance of by
the legislatures of many states in enacting
laws for the purpose of compelling the carrying of liability insurance one type of which is
our own Financial Responsibility Act. Inasmuch as the purpose of the insurance is to
protect not only the insured, but the public
generally, the right which arises in anyone
iriured by an insured motorist should not be
regarded lightly, nor permitted to be subverted by other parties over whom the injured
one has no control (emphasis added). Peterson v. Western Casualty & Surety Company,
supra.
8

In order to effect that general purpose and to
promote justice, the act must be liberally construed.
§§41-12-39, 68-3-2 U.C.A. 1953.
A. §41-12-21(f) (1) APPLIES BY ITS
TERMS TO ALL VEHICLE LIABILITY POLICIES.
Under the Act, a carrier may not, after a loss
has occurred, void its policy, §41-12-21(f)(l).
(f) Every motor vehicle liability policy shall
be subject to the following provisions which
need not be contained therein:
( 1) The liability of the insurance carrier
with respect to the insurance required by
this act shall become absolute whenever injury
or damage covered by said motor vehicle
liability policy occurs; said policy may not be
canceled or annulled as to such liability by
any agreement between the insurance carrier
and insured after the occurrence of the injury
m· damage; no statement made by the insured
or on his behalf and no violation of said
policy shall defeat or void said policy ...
State Farm contends that "every motor vehicle
liability policy" means only such few policies as are
certified by the carrier as proof of financial
responsibility, citing §41-12-21 (a) :
A "motor vehicle liability policy""' as said
term is used in this act shall mean an owner's
or an operator's policy of liability insurance,
certified as provided in section 41-12-19 or
section 41-12-20 as proof of financial responsibility, and issued, except as otherwise
(\

provided in section 41-12-20, by an insurance
carrier duly authorized to transact business
in this state, to or for the benefit of the
person named therein as insured.
It is clear, however, that "motor vehicle liability

policy" does not mean a certified policy whenever
used in the act. The next succeeding section,
which requires all polices to provide
uninsured motorist coverage in furtherance of the
Act's general purpose, uses the term "motor vehicle
liability policy" in the title and the term "automobile
liability insurance policy" in the text. Without
question, uninsured motorist coverage, unless waived
in writing, is required of all motor vehicle policies,
not just those certified as proof of financial responsibility. Southeast Furniture Company v. Barrett,
465 P.2d 346, 24 U.2d 24 (1970). The term
"automobile liability insurance policy" used in
obviously refers to and is used interchangeably with "motor vehicle liability policy".
Otherwise, vehicles other than automobiles would not
be required to have uninsured motorist coverage.
The Act however, by its terms, covers motor vehicles,
not just automobiles. §42-12-1 (3) U.C.A. 1953.
Futhermore, the text of §42-12-21.1 refers to the
"automobile" policy as insuring against loss arising
out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a
''motor vehicle." If this court rules that "motor
vehicle liability policy" is a term of art in subsection
(f) (1), it must likewise rule that it is a term of art
10
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in section 41-12-21-1.1 with reference to uninsured
motorist coverage, thereby exempting from the
requirement of such coverage all policies except those
certified as proof of financial responsibility. It is
precisely, however, against those of whom such proof
is required that the legislature intended to afford
uninsured motorist protection. Accordingly, "motor
vehicle liability policy" is not a term of art and
means in subsection ( f) ( 1), every vehicle liability
policy issued in the State of Utah.
In 1'41-12-21 subsections "b" "c" "d" and "e"
'
'
'
'
commence with the words "such" owner's policy of
liability insurance," "such operator's policy" or
"such motor vehicle liability policy", clearly referring to the certified policy described in subsection
''a". Subsection "f", however, states: "Every motor
vehicle liability policy shall be subject to the
following provisions which need not be contained
therein." (Emphasis added) This is further indication that "motor vehicle liability policy" is not a
term of art.
There follow four provisions which are not
peculiar to certified policies but are general requirements intended to apply to all liability insurance
policies. For example, §31-19-25 which is not
restricted to certified policies, as well as §41-12-21
(f) ( 1), prohibits, after occurrence of the loss,
retroactive annulment between the insurer and the
insured.
11
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No insurance contract insming
agamst loss or damage through legal liability
for the bodily injury or death by accident of
any person, or for damage to the property
of any person, shall be retroactively annulled
by any agreement between the insurer and
insured after the occurrence of any such
injury, death, or damage for which the
insured may be liable, and any such annulment attempted shall be void.
does not refer to an agreement made after
the loss, for no insured would be so disposed, but
to an annulment attempted after the loss with reference to an agreement made with the insured prior to
the loss. An example of such an agreement is the so
called diminished liability clause which provides for
a decrease in benefits if the insured engages in a
a different occupation considered more hazardous
than the one under which he was insured, 8 ALR2d
481. State Farm in the case at bar contends for the
weaker position that upon Wood's breach of an
agreement contained in the policy, namely, the
misrepresentation that statements contained on the
application were true, State Farm should be permitted retroactively to annul the accident insurance.
Both §41-12-21 (f) ( 1) and §31-19-25 prohibit its
doing so. This is because wheras an insurer usually
has no notice that its insured later undertakes a
more hazardous occupation than that under which
he became insured, State Farm had the means to
protect itself against Wood's awkward fraud.
Wood allegedly agreed with State Farm that the
12
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representations were true. State Farm contends
that if not true, it may by operation of law, assuming
proof of reasonable reliance on the false information,
have rescisson. In other words, s31-19-25 states that
retroactive annulment of accident insurance based
on p1·e-loss agreement, is void. It follows more
strongly that a retroactive annulment of accident
insurance based on the breach of a pre-loss agreement, is also void.
Therefore, §31-19-25 supports Williams' position that §41-12-21 (f) (1) is intended to apply
to all vehicle liability policies. In any event,
applies to prevent retroactive annulment
by State Farm of Wood's policy, regardless of
whether or not §41-12-21 (f) (1) applies to the
policy in question.
Given the purpose of the act, the intent of the
legislature was to protect the innocent third party
injured by the insured from suffering the improvidence or dishonesty of the insured in dealing with
his carrier prior to the occurrence of the loss. The
carrier, being a sophisticated specialist in the
business of insuring risks has the time and resources
to protect itself. Notwithstanding its substantial
underwriting experience and investigative resources,
State Farm would have Williams suffer twice:
once for Wood's negligence and once for his
dishonesty.
The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident
13

resulting in injury or death or property damage to
the apparent extent of at least $100.00 must forward
to the Department of Public Safety a report contain. i
ing information relative to the existence of insurance i
s41-6-37 (c). From this information the Depart-'
ment determines whether the requirements for the •
deposit of security are inapplicable by reason of the
insurance §41-12-4. If the requirements of sub- i
section ( f) ( 1) were to apply only to certified :
policies, the purpose of the act would be defeated.;
The insured could obtain a policy which would
exempt him from the security and suspension·
provisions of the act and yet fail to cover the
particular accident. In that event, any automobile ·
liability policy, no matter how limited the coverage
or fraudulent the application, taken out prior to the
insured's first accident, would protect the insured
from ever having to obtain the type of coverage
required as proof of financial responsibility.
Iszczukiewicz v. Universal Underwriters, Inc. Company, 182 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Ohio 1960). In effect,
that is what happened in the case at bar. Since
the policy was in force at the time of the loss, Wood
could give policy information to the Department of
Public Safety regarding coverage by State Farm
and thus be exempt from the security and suspension
provisions of the act. Later, after the statutory
reporting period expired, State Farm denied cover·
age and sued to rescind the policy. The result is that
Vvood continued to drive, and State Farm had a

1

I
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sure risk: it continued to collect premiums until a
loss, after which it rescinded with impunity. Accordingly, enlightened courts have read both the
absolute liability and omnibus requirements for
"certified" policies into all motor vehicle policies in
order to protect the integrity of the act. In Standard
Accident Insurance Company v. All-state Insurance
Company, 178 A.2d 358 (N.J. 1962) a MATO
endorsement, purporting to limit coverage to operation of a vehicle by the named insured and others
of a limited group, was rendered void because not in
compliance with the financial responsibility act.
The omnibus clause referred to in the opinion is
foundin§41-12-21 (b) (2) of the Utah Act.
Equally, if not more important is the fact
that if the MATO endorsement were given
any validity, it would run completely counter
to the legislative policy evident in the present
Motor Vehicle Security-Responsibility Law.
Today, the statutory omnibus clause is only
required to be included in a policy "furnished
as proof of financial responsibility." N.J.S.A.
39 :6-46. As noted, the security section of
N.J.S.A. 39 :6-25 is not applicable if there is
in effect "an automobile liability policy with
respect to the motor vehicle involved is such
accident." Although there is no explicit
statutory requirement that such a policy, in
order to relieve the insured from the security
provision must conform to the requirement
of N.J.S.A. 39 :6-46 to 48, it would be
anomalous to say that the statute does not
require such insurance to conform to the
coverage which insures not only the named
15

insured but "any other person using or
responsible for the use of any such motor
vehicle with the express or implied consent
of the insured." If this were not so, an owner
by taking out a policy covering the automobile
onfy when he was driving, could avoid the
impact of the Security-Responsiblility Law.
N.J.S.A. 39 :6-23 et seq. Remedial legislation
should not be so interpreted.
In addition to the statutory mandate that tJe
Act be construed to effect its purpose, well known
and venerable rules of statutory construction prevent the use of "motor vehicle liability policy" as
a term of art from undermining the remedial force
of the act. As observed by Chancellor Kent:
In the exposition of a statute the intention of
the lawmaker will prevail over the Ii teral
sense of the terms and its reason and intention
will prevail over the strict letter. When the
words are not explicit, the intention is to be
collected from the context; from the occasion
and necessity of the law; from the mischief
felt and the remedy in view, and the intention
should be taken or presumed according to
what is consistent with reason and good
discretion. Statutes and Statutory Construction, J. G. Sutherland (3rd Ed. 1943) §§4704,.
4706.
'
B. THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE UTAH
SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY ACT REQUIRES THAT §41-12-21 (f) (1) THEREOF APPLY TO ALL VEHICLE LIABIL·
ITY POLICIES.
It is undisputed that when Wood made
16

application and the policy was issued by State Farm,
Wood's license had been revoked and he had been
convicted of traffic violations during revocation
(Appellant's brief p. 6, R-27) For a person whose
license has been suspended or revoked, proof of
financial responsibility is compulsory. §41-12-17.5.
In fact, the entire statutory scheme of the Safety
Responsibility Act has been regarded by this court
as so fraught with the public interest as to call for
compulsary insurance.
Since 1951 we have had our financial responsibility act, the practical effect of which is
that nearly all cars are covered by insurance
and the popular belief seems to be that it is
compulsary. Robinson v. Hreinson, 409 .2d
121, 17 U.2d 261 (1965).
The ever-increasing number of injuries from
automobile accidents and the high proportion
of drivers who have insufficent financial
responsibility has been taken cognizance of
by the legislatures of many states in enacting
laws for the purpose of compelling the carrying of liability insurance, one type of which
is our own Financial Responsibility Act.
(Emphasis added) Peterson v. Western Casualty and Surety Company, supra.
At page 7 of its brief, appellant admits that had
Wood requested proof of financial responsibility
under the Act, the policy "would have been placed
with one of the substandard risk companies within
the State Farm Mutual Organization." The policy
so placed would have been subject without question,
17

to the provisions of §41-12-21 (f) ( 1). State Farrn
would have placed the policy with fs substandard
carrier, notwithstanding Woods record, because
substandard i·isks are apportioned by law among all
insurance companies authorized to issue automobile
liability policies in Utah §41-12-35 U.C.A. 1953.
Accordingly, insurance on Wood was compulsory
under the Act. When compulsory, it is universally
held that coverage cannot be rescinded because of
fraud, 83ALR2d1104.
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Company v.
O'Connor, 170 N.E. 2d 681 (N.Y. 1960), the
applicant under an assigned risk plan, falsely
stated that he had not been convicted of any nonvehicular offense within a preceeding three-year
period. The court held that the carrier could not
avoid the policy from its inception since that remedy
was not provided by the Act.
The effect of the Plan is to enforce upon the
insurer the necessity to discover fraud at the
earliest possible moment, before an accident
occurs and the rights of innocent injured
third parties have intervened. In this respect,
the Plan merely reflects the oft-repeated
legislative recognition that
is not the concern solely of the msured and his
insurer.

* * * *

While, therefore, Aetna may utimately be
held on a policy obtained by fraud, its liability
is in a very real sense attributable to its own
18

fault, and the true beneficiary is not the
wrongdoer, but his innocent victims.
Furthermore, if State Farm would have insured

Wood, notwithstanding his record, misrepresentation as to that record was not material to acceptance

of the risk by State Farm. Accordingly, not being
material to the risk, rescission may not be had for
fraud in the procurement.
At the very least, Wood was a person required
by the Act to demonstrate financial responsibility
for the protection of one he might injure. In State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Wall,
222 A.2d 282 (N.J. 1966) the court held that "if
the assured was in the class of those who could have
been called upon by the Director to furnish proof of
financial responsibility, any policy subsequently
issued to him was deemed to be in conformance with
the act, irrespective of the fact that the Director
never in fact demanded the requisite proof." (p.
287) Wall was convicted of speeding and his license
revoked prior to issuance of the policy. As a result,
the act became applicable to him, p. 286. Wall
misrepresented to State Farm the status of his
license. The policy provided that it would comply
with the financial responsibility law only when
certified. The Director made no demand upon Wall
for proof of financial responsibility and State Farm
never certified the policy as such proof.

* * * we cannot conceive it to be the legis19

lative design to infringe upon the public
protection it had already wisely established.
To blithely resolve to the contrary in construing the language here employed would not be
justified or warranted.

* * * *

Thus we hold that the vitality of the Steliga
rule subsists and applies to all persons who
could be required to furnish proof of financial ·
responsibility under N.J.S.A. 39 :6-31, irrespective of the fact that the director has not
required such proof to be furnished. Since ·
Wall was of that class, the policy issued him
by State Farm was rendered noncancellable ',
as against the injured claimants by virtue of
N.J.S.A. 39 :6-40 and 48.
Appellant points to Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company v. Chugg, 315 P.2d 277, 6 U.2d 399
(1957) to support its position that the act is not
applicable to State Farm's policy, it not having been
certified or issued pursuant thereto. In Chugg, the
carrier raised an exclusion clause exempting coverage in the event the insured operated the vehicle
under the influence of alcohol. It was held on appeal
that the evidence was insufficient to prove the
insured's intoxication and therefore that the trial
court had committed error in concluding that the
policy did not afford coverage. Since coverage was
upheld, the court's statements relative to the applicability of the safety responsibility act are obiter
20

•
:
!

·

dicta not necessary to the decision. 1 "A 'Dictum' is
an expression by the court, but which, not being
necessarily involved in the case, lacks the force of
an adjudication." Callahan v. Salt Lake City, 125
P.863, 41 U. 300 (1912). Even as dicta, the court's
remarks distinguish Chugg from the case at bar.
It was also disclosed by the evidence that
Chugg had never been required by the Division of Safety and Financial Responsibility
of this state, prior to this accident, to show
proof of financial responsibility.

*

* *

*

Unless Chugg had been within the purview
of the Act when the policy was issued, its
-1
The issue of the act's applicability was apparently
raised only because the trial court found that the
driver was intoxicated at the time of the accident
thereby preventing recovery by ·the injured party
under the policy. Therefore, it was sought to extend coverage under the act. By reversing the
trial court's finding and since there was insufficient evidence of the driver's intoxication, so that
coverage was in force, the application of the act
was not germane to the court's ruling. The
question of whether or not the Safety Responsibility Act applied to the case would not have varied
the court's decision in the least. Justices Worthen
and Henroid concurred in the result only. Justices
McDonough and Crockett limited their concurrance deeming it unnecessary to consider the
nature and extent of the affirmative relief
afforded by declaratory judgment. The court
clearly recognized that all that was needed for
decision and coverage was to find that there had
been insufficient evidence of the driver's intoxication to trigger the policy's exclusion clause.
21

provisions, unless illegal, are subject to the
same construction as any other contract, in
accordance with the expressed intent of the
parties. Here the contract clearly provided
that there would be no coverage if the accident
occurred while Chugg was intoxicated when
he was driving.
\Vood, on the contrary, had been required to show
proof of financial responsibility under the terms of
the Act. See November 16, 1966 SR 22 Form of
Jerry Clarence \Vood, on file with the Driver's
License Division of the Department of Public Safety.
Appendix A, §§41-2-12, 78-26-1, 63-2-61 (1) U.C.A.
1953. McGarry v. Thomson, supra, at p. 291, 31 CJS
Evidence §36. Once required, proof of financial
responsibility must be maintained at least threeyears. §41-12-29 ( 1) U.C.A. 1953. It is conceded
that the policy in question was not certified as proof
of financial responsibility. At the very least, howver, Wood was clearly within the purview of the act
when the policy was issued. The court in Chugg
quoted from McCann v. Continental Casualty Cornpany as follows:
There was no evidence in the record that the
insured had had a previous accident or that
there was any unsatisfied judgment growing
out of an accident against him, nor is there
any contention that in any way by his
previous conduct the insured came within the
scope of the Act. Only if his prior conduct
had been such that he was required to make
proof of financial responsibility under the
Act would the provision contained in para22

graph 58k have been of necessity, under
clause 8 of the policy, incorporated therein.
Clearly, by statute and as a matter of public record,
of which this court may take judicial notice, Wood
was within the scope of the Utah Safety Responsibility Act when State Farm issued its policy.
In addition to Chugg, Appellant has cited
numerous cases at pages 14-16 of its brief, the great
majority of which involve the omnibus clause section
of various state financial responsibility laws urged
to apply for the purpose of extending coverage
in the face of policy exclusions. Few of the cited
cases involve rescission for misrepresentation and
none considers whether or not the driver's status
should invoke application of the act. Of those cited,
McCann, supra, and Farmers Insurance Exchange
'V. Ledesma, 214 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1954) are
: favorable to Respondent's position.
In s u m m a r y, the m a j o r i t y of courts
considering the question have merely held that the
coverage provisions of a financial responsibility act
do not apply to the first accident because, under
the statute, no motorist is required to carry any
insurance until he has become involved in his first
accident or has had his license revoked. Johnson v.
Universal Automobile Insurance Assoc'iation. (Appellant's brief p. 15). Wood, however, when the
policy was issued, had been invloved in two accidents,
had been convicted of numerous traffic violations,
and his license had been revoked.
23

By contrast to Appellant's authority, the recent
case of Farmer's Insurance Exchange v. Rose, 411
F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1969), is precisely in point.
There the injured party's motion for summary .
judgment against the carrier was granted on the
grounds that once an accident had occured, the
liability of the insurer became absolute, regardless of '
the defense or fraud in procurement of the policy.
1

I

. . . we start with the established principle
that all automobile liability contracts in Arizona, whether or not "certified" under the
Arizona Financial Responsibility Act, are
controlled by . . . . that act, regardless of
contract provisions to the contrary.

'
1

,
:
.

* * * *

Moreover, the Arizona Supreme Court's very
broad reading of the Arizona Financial
Responsibility Act .... shows that the courts
of Arizona have chosen to construe that
statute in the light of what they regard as
Arizona policy.
In Rose, the section of the act in question,
'
ARSA 1956, is in all pertinent parts, identical to ,
§41-12-21 U.C.A. 1953.
The court in Jenkins v. Mayflower Insurance !
Exchange, 380 P.2d 145, (Ariz. 1963), held that a
restrictive driver endorsement would not defeat the
claim of an injured party in light of the purpose of
the financial responsibility act. In so doing, it cited ,
as authority California's construction of a similar
section of its own act.
1
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The defendant company, however, has raised
a highly technical defense for which they cite
much authority and which they claim distinguishes this case from the California cases.
The argument goes as follows: . . . . This
policy is not a "certified" policy and thus the
omnibus clause is not made a part of the policy
by the Financial Responsibility Law.

* * * *

.... The Financial Responsibility Act has for
its principle purpose the protection of the
public using the highways from financial
hardship which may result from the use of
automobiles by financially irresponsible persons.
* * * *
.... We cannot constitutionally allow artful
distinctions between "motor vehicle liability
policy", "automobile liability policy" or "policy of insurance" to defeat the purpose of the
act.
* * * *
We hold, therefore, that the omnibus clause
is a part of every motor vehicle liability policy,
by whatever name it may be called.
See also Sandoval v. Chenoweth, 428 P.2d 98 (Ariz.
1967) making specifically §28-1170 (f) (1) ARSA
1956 applicable to all insurance contracts.
The leading California case on the issue at bar
is Wildman v. Government Employees' Insurance
Company, 307 P.2d 359 (Cal. 1957). At issue was
coverage under the omnibus clause (comparable to
§41-12-21 (b) (2), U.C.A. 1953). At that time the
California act did not define a motor vehicle policy
25

in terms of certification as proof of financial respon.
1
sibility. Interinsurance Exchange of Autonwbih
Club v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, 373 P.2d
640 (Cal. 1964) at p. 644 n.2. Wildnwn held that
s415 must be made a part of every policy of
insurance issued by an insurer since the public policy
of California was to make the owners of motor
vehicles financially responsible to those injured by
them in the operation of vehicles.
The statute is founded upon principles of I
public policy and an anamolous situation
would be created if the rights of third parties,
for whose protection the law was adopted,
could be hindered, delayed or defeated by the
private agreements of two of the parties to a
triparty contract. ( p. 364)
Six weeks after Wildman was decided the definition
of "motor vehicle liability policy" was amended to
mean a policy "certified ... as proof of ability to
respond in damages ... " Interinsurance Exchange
of Automobile Club v. Ohio Casualty Insurance
Company, supra, p. 644 n.4. In view of the major
public policy subserved by the act, the California
Supreme Court did not believe that the legislature
intended the remedial protection afforded for the
benefit of the public to be reserved to only the "small
(less than 1 per cent of the total) number of liability
policies which are certified annually to the Depart·
ment of Motor Vehicles" p. 645. Accordingly, it
reaffirmed Wildman notwithstanding the statutory
requirement of certification:
2G

. . . . "[T]he entire automobile financial responsibility law must be liberally construed
to foster its main objective of giving "monetary. protection to that ever changing and
tragically large group of persons who while
lawfully using the highways themselves, suffer grave injury through the negligent use
of those highways by others." To hold that
the 1957 legislation abrogated the rule of
Wildman, would violate this rule of liberal
construction and would be contrary to the
trend indicated in recent legislative and judicial determinations involving the Vehicle
Code. That trend is obvious. Thus in the past
few years the minimum monetary limits of
the financial responsibility law have been
greatly increased .... every liability policy
issued must cover the assured for injuries or
damage caused by the negligence of drivers of
uninsured motor vehicles .... in the interest
of safety the suspension of licenses of those
convicted of drunk driving by administrative
determination has been permitted . . . the
permissive user statute has been liberally
construed . . . and liability extended over
other provisions of the Vehicle Code dealing
with liability insurance .... The pattern is
clearly discernible: a desire on the part of
the judiciary and the Legislature to not only
prevent the astronomical accident toll in this
state, but to also provide compensation for
those injured through no fault of their own.
The interpretation suggested by Ohio would
contravene this policy." (Emphasis in text)
Interinsiirance Excha.:nge of Automobile Club
v. Ohio Cas?ialty Insurance Company, s·upra,
p. 646.
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The same legislative and judicial pattern is clearly
discernible in Utah. The interpretation urged by
State Farm contravenes the policy of the Utah Act
to safeguard the motoring public from persons like
vVood.
POE.,;T III
THE STATE FARM POLICY IS NOT A PRIVATE CONTRACT ENTITLED TO PROTECTION FROM PUBLIC IMPAIRMENT.

Appell::mt charges the trial court with impairing its contract with the defendants in violation of
the Federal and State Constitutions. In effect, Appellant seeks to impair its own contract by rescinding
it against one with whom it did not contract, but for
whose benefit the contract was entered. As stated
by Pound:
Taking no account of legislative (i.e., noncommon law) limitations upon freedom of
contract, in the purely judicial development
of our law we have taken the law of insurance
practically out of the category of contract,
and we have established that the duties of
public service companies are not contractual,
as the nineteenth century sought to make
them, but are instead relational; they do not
flow from agreements which the public ser·
vant may make as he chooses, they flow
the calling in which he has engaged and his
consequent relation to the public. (Gray v.
Zurich Insurance Company, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104
(1966).
No court denies either the public aspect of automo·
bile liability msurance or the fact that state
28

financial responsibility laws are to protect the
motoring public through the compulsory use of
liability insurance or other proof of financial
responsibility. With reference to the California
financial responsibility law, the court in Interinsurance Exchange of Automobile Club v. Ohio
Casualty Insurance Co., 17 Cal. Rptr. 259 ( 1961)
said:
It appears to be a rule of universal acceptation
that the clause of the federal Constitution
and those of the several state Constitutions
prohibiting the impairment of obligations of
contracts runs only to conventional contracts
created by the mutual consent of the parties
and not to quasi-contractual obligations imposed by the law and without procuring the
consent of the party to be charged.
Where parties contract upon a subject that is
surrounded by statutory limitations and requirements, they are presumed to have entered into their
contract with reference to such statute, and the
same enters and becomes a part of the contract.
Particularly, where the purpose of such a statute
is protection of the public interest, it is the carrier
which is prohibited from impairing that protection
by its contract rather than the court, which is
prohibited from impairing the contract by enforcing
the statutory protection.
POINT IV
JOINDER OF W.W. CLYDE & COMPANY IS
NOT PERMITTED UNDER THE RULES.

Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company v.
29

Chugg, supra, holds that it would be error to compel
joinder of an injured party in a suit for declaraton
relief by a carrier against its insured, at p. 281.
the same basis, the court may not compel joinder of
the injured party's employer. Although favorable
to Williams' position on joinder, this holding again
appears to be erroneous dictum. State Farm by its
joinder has admitted that Williams has an interest
in the policy and it seems settled that a tort victim
has an interest that cannot in his absence be
independently altered or determined by the insurer
and insured, in or out of court. Shapiro v. Republic
Indemnity Company of America, 341 P.2d 289
(Cal. 1959). Even so, a self-insured employer who
has paid compensation is a trustee of its employee's
cause of action against a third-party tort-feasor.
§35-1-62 U.C.A. 1953. Being a trustee, the employer
is barred from independent action against the tort·
feasor (and his insurer) should the employee's
claim fail. In addition, as State Farm appreciates,
any compensation paid to Williams by employer
liability insurance or its equivalent, has no relevance
under the joinder rules to State Farm's claim
against Williams. Young v. Barney, 433 P.2d 846, !
20U.2d108, (1967).
.
1

CONCLUSION
That an employed musician, 26 years old, had:
never been licensed to drive, had never owned a car, ·
and had never been insured, but was applying for
30

insurance for his wife to drive his first car, is
implausible at best. The pleadings reveal that Wood
gave his correct full name to State Farm. The
requests for Admissions served by State Farm show
that it had obtained Wood's driving record in detail.
Under the circumstances, State Farm should, as a
matter of law, be held to have waived Wood's
transparent misrepresentations or else in view of
the ease of verifying Wood's statements, be estopped
from rescinding the policy 5Vz months after the loss.
Furthermore, it being admitted that State
Farm would have insured Wood notwithstanding
his record, any alleged fraud was not material to
acceptance of the risk and cannot, therefore, be
used to rescind the policy.
Most importantly, the policy of the Safety
Responsibility Act, to protect the motoring public
from the effects of negligent financially irresponsible drivers, requires that the coverage afforded
by every motor vehicle liability policy become
absolute upon the occurence of loss, inespective of
fraud in the procurement. Even under State
Farm's narrow interpretation of the Act, the provisions of §41-12-21 (f) (1) apply to State Farm's
policy issued to Wood, whose prior conduct brought
him within the scope and purview of the Act as one
against whom the public was entitled to the
])l'otection of financial responsibility. Not having
used the same care in processing Wood's application
31

that it later summoned in order to rescind the policy,
State Farm is bound by its contract, as to whicn
·Williams is a third-party beneficiary by statute.
Respectfully Submitted,
THOMAS M. BURTON, of
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY
Suite 300, 141 East 1st So.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
ROBERT L GARDNER
172 North Main Street
Cedar City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent, Michael D.
Williams
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This certification is effective from -·----·---·-----------·-·---·--------·······----····-·--·-·-····and contmues until canceled or
terminated in accordance with the financial responsibility laws and regulations of this state.
The insurance hereby certified is provided by an:
D OWNER'S POLICY-applicable to the following described vehicle(s):
Year of Model

1966

Trade Name

Dodge

Model

I Charger

Body Type

2 D:r.

Identification No.

-

-

(II space abo•e 1s Insufficient to contain all mowr 1ehldes covered. prepare list on paper or ldenUcal width and paste on.)
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0 OPERATOR'S POLICY-Applicable to any non-owned vehicle.

SR-22
-·--···---··········----·-············-···--···-···-····-·--··
FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY INSURANCE CERTIFICATE
(Statl)

The company signatory hereto hereby certifies that it has issued to the above named insured a
motor vehicle liability policy as required by the financial responsibility laws of this state, which
policy is in effect on the effective date of this certificate.
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FINANCIAL RESPO.'.\"SIBILITY FORM

(Copy)

NBCU 3541 A

Signature of Authorized Representative
(Thia copy will be returned to the addrea!\ shn1'·n ttn reverse
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)ubscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of January,

,m.

Utah

